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I. Introduction 
In a recent decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in connection with the 
challenge of an arbitral award,1 the question came up whether pre-arbitration 
conciliation (or mediation, as the case may be) is required before arbitration 
proceedings can be instituted if the parties have agreed on such a mechanism.2 
The Federal Tribunal - in taking the established facts and the wording of the 
specific clause into account - agreed with the arbitral tribunal and found that it 
was not. The Federal Tribunal, however, did not decide on the question of 
whether such a requirement introduced by the parties affects the arbitral 
tribunal's jurisdiction to hear the dispute in the first place. This note deals with 
this question and other problems possibly resulting from such clauses. 
The dispute decided by the Federal Tribunal arose out of a contractual 
relationship between a French developer of automatic machines and other 
industrial products and a Chinese branch of a group being active in the field of 
producing household appliances. The contract, among others, contained a 
clause stating that the contract and all legal relations arising out of it was to be 
governed by Swiss law. It continued3 that all controversies and all disagreements 
in the relationship arising in connection with this contract and which could not be 
amicably solved (including conciliation under the rules of WIPO4) should be 
submitted to an arbitral tribunal which should be competent to definitely decide 
the dispute, with the exclusion of ordinary courts. It further stated that the arbitral 
tribunal should be solely competent to decide on all disputes concerning the 
 
1
  4A_18/2007, available online at: www.bger.ch. See also the comments contributed by Tavenier Tschanz, 
Supreme Court Clarifies Pre-Arbitration Conciliation Requirement, in: International Law Office Newsletter of 
September 6, 2007, online at: http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters. 
2
  So-called "Med-Arb clauses", see HOCHSTRASSER|BLESSING, in: Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), 
Internationales Privatrecht, 2nd ed., Basel 2007, Einleitung zum Zwölften Kapitel: Grundlagen, N 329; PETER, 
Med-Arb in International Arbitration, in: American Review of International Arbitration (ARIA) 1997, Vol. 8. No. 1., 
pp. 83-116; BUEHRING-UHLE, Co-Med-Arb Technique Holds Promise for Getting Best of Both Worlds, 2006 Juris 
Net. Such clauses are also titled "multi-tiered" or "ADR-first" or "escalation" clauses. See BERGER, Law and 
Practice of Escalation Clauses, in: Arbitration International, Vol. 22 No. 1 (2006), pp. 1-17, p. 1. 
3
  Clause 10.2: "Toute controverse et tout différend en rapport avec le présent contrat et qui ne pourront être 
résolus à l'amiable (y compris la conciliation selon les règles de l'OMPI) devront être soumis à un tribunal 
arbitral qui sera seul compétent pour décider définitivement, à l'exclusion des tribunaux ordinaires. Au surplus, 
le tribunal arbitral sera seul compétent pour statuer sur tout différend concernant l'applicabilité de cette clause 
d'arbitrage. Des négociations en cours ne constitueront en aucun cas un empêchement à l'engagement de la 
procédure arbitrale." 
4
  World Intellectual Property Organization, www.wipo.int. 
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applicability of this arbitration clause. The clause continued that ongoing 
negotiations should not constitute an impediment for engaging in arbitration 
proceedings. 
II. Importance of the Question 
The question of whether the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction is affected by an 
agreement to try to settle the dispute by means of meditation first is of crucial 
importance. 
As Professor Berger has put it, such clauses bear a particular risk of being 
pathological and, hence, inoperable for an arbitral tribunal.5 This could lead to the 
result that the parties' former intention could be frustrated. When dispute already 
arose, it could be impossible to agree on another non-pathological clause. 
Additionally, in the case of pathological clauses, besides different courts or 
arbitral tribunals possibly being competent to decide on the meaning of the 
clause and, hence, on their jurisdiction, different courts could be competent to 
hear the merits of the case. 
Furthermore, issues regarding periods of limitations may arise. For example, it 
could be impossible to interrupt running periods of limitations during the 
mediation process and the claimant's claim could become time-barred while the 
parties' dispute-resolution process has already been initiated. 
Moreover, in some rare cases, the normative interpretation of the mediation-
arbitration clause might entitle one party to avoid the arbitration agreement. This 
could then lead to inefficiency or even greater procedural problems. 
Additionally, if the arbitral tribunal accepts its jurisdiction, the award might later 
be challenged. 
A. The Parties' Possibility to Define the Arbitral Tribunal's Jurisdiction 
The problem resulting from unclear clauses is that an arbitral tribunal will 
cautiously avoid that its award will later be set aside because of its lack of 
 
5
  BERGER, op. cit., p. 1. 
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jurisdiction. It is one of the arbitral tribunal's primary duties to render an 
enforceable award.6 
The parties, namely, can limit an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction in various ways. 
This will of the parties defines the frame of the arbitral tribunal's competence. 
The scope of the arbitration agreement can be limited to specific material 
questions. It could also, for example, be limited with respect to time.7 The parties 
can subject the effectiveness of the arbitration agreement to various precedent8 
or resolutory9 conditions.10 The validity of the arbitration agreement in such events 
is to be determined by the arbitral tribunal11 by applying either12 the law chosen by 
the parties, the law governing the dispute or Swiss law, as the case may be 
(Article 178 para. 2 PILA). 
1. Conditional Arbitration Agreements 
If Swiss law applies, as was the case in the decision of the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal presented in the beginning, Article 151 and the following articles of the 
 
6
  See HORVATH, The Duty of the Tribunal to Render an Enforceable Award, J. Int'l Arb. Vol. 18/2 (2001), pp. 135–
158, for more information regarding this duty. 
7
  In a case decided by the Federal Tribunal in 1995, the parties agreed that the dispute be submitted to an 
arbitral tribunal within a time limit of 30 days. The Federal Tribunal found that this means that the parties 
wanted to exclude the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction after the expiry of this time limit. See Federal Tribunal, 
decision of 17 August 1995, in: ASA Bulletin 1996, p. 678-679. 
8
  German: "Suspensivbedingungen" (CO) or "auflösende Bedingungen" (German BGB). For the example of 
mediation proceedings as a possible condition precedent to arbitration agreements, see RÜEDE|HADENFELDT, 
op. cit., p. 194 at footnote 456. See also HIM Portland v. DeVito Builders, Inc., No. 02-1955 (1st Cir. Jan. 17, 
2003), Dispute Resolution Journal, Feb-Apr 2003, summarized online at: 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3923/is_200302/ai_n9225817. Online at: 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=1st/021955.html. 
9
  German: "Resolutivbedingungen". 
10
  See RÜEDE|HADENFELDT, Schweizerisches Schiedsgerichtsrecht, 2nd ed., Zurich 1993, p. 59. 
11
  Doctrine of (relative) Competence-Competence (Article 186 para. 1 PILA). Cf. DFC 128 III 50, p. 59 et seq. The 
doctrine of Competence-Competence, i.e., the arbitral tribunal's power to decide on its own competence to hear 
the dispute, is "relative", because it only applies vis-à-vis a regular state court (and other tribunals). The control 
of the arbitral tribunal's decision by the Federal Tribunal (Article 190 para. 2 lit. b PILA) is not affected by this 
doctrine. 
12
  Alternatively. If it is valid under one of these laws, the arbitration agreement is accepted to be valid. See 
WENGER|MÜLLER, in: Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), op. cit., Art. 178 N 24. 
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Swiss Code of Obligations (CO) apply with regard to conditions to which the 
arbitration agreement possibly is subject. 
The very moment the condition is fulfilled, the validity of a clause that was 
subject to a condition commences (Article 151 para. 2 CO). In other words, if the 
parties introduced mediation as a condition precedent, there is no valid 
arbitration agreement before the mediation ended unsuccessfully. 
Whether or not the parties actually wanted to suspend the effectiveness of the 
arbitration agreement, is to be answered by means of interpretation of the 
contract. 
2. Interpreting the Arbitration Agreement 
a) The Arbitrator's or Judge's Approach of Establishing the Parties' Will 
In order to establish the content of an agreement, the parties' true will is relevant 
(Article 18 para. 1 CO).13 The wording of the parties' respective declarations 
serves as a starting point.14 The respective party's behaviour after the conclusion 
of the contract, as well as other elements such as business practices are also 
relevant.15 When the true will of each party is established, it is decisive whether 
there was a meeting of the parties' minds.16 If, after this first phase of 
interpretation, it is obvious that the parties had a corresponding will, the contract 
had been concluded with the respective content.17 
If, however, the true will of the parties differs, or is unascertainable in the first 
place - as is the case with unclear mediation-arbitration clauses -, the question of 
the meeting of the minds and, hence, the content of a contract is to be 
 
13
  KRAMER, Berner Kommentar, VI|1|1, Bern 1986, Art. 18 N 21. 
14
  KRAMER, op. cit., Art. 18 N 22. 
15
  KRAMER, op. cit., Art. 18 N 28, 29. 
16
  KRAMER, op. cit., Art. 18 N 21. 
17
  The situation where there was no meeting of the minds and where the parties knew about this fact is also 
unproblematic. See KRAMER, op. cit., Art. 18 N 67. In this case, no contract was concluded - or, in the present 
context, no condition precedent or resolutory introduced with regard to the effectiveness of the arbitration 
agreement. 
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established by objective elements based on principles of reliance.18 Here, all 
circumstances of the case, including the wording of the declarations and 
business practices etc., must again be taken into account.19 The approach, 
however, is principally different. The arbitrator does not try to establish the true 
will of the parties at this stage but rather asks whether the recipient of the 
declaration correctly interpreted the indications of the other party's true will under 
the circumstances of the conclusion of the respective contract.20 If a reasonable 
recipient of the other party's declaration standing in the shoes of the actual 
recipient would have been entitled to and in fact would have had to understand it 
the way it was understood, this understanding is relevant.21 
With regard to the question of the effectiveness of an arbitration agreement 
before the unsuccessful effort to solve the dispute by means of mediation, this 
procedure also is the correct approach.22 
b) The Parties' Possibility to Clarify Their Will 
This interpretation by the arbitrators or judges entails a certain risk of an 
interpretation that is not in favour of one party. But, the parties have the 
possibility to limit the arbitrators' or judges' possibility to interpret their agreement. 
This would enhance their legal certainty and the predictability, for example, with 
regard to costs or the length of the settlement of their dispute. 
Wording such as "the parties may refer to mediation", should make it sufficiently 
clear that mediation is a mere voluntary option before initiating arbitration 
 
18
  DFC 125 III 305, p. 308; KRAMER, op. cit., Art. 18 N 67; SCHWENZER, Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht 
Allgemeiner Teil, 4th ed., Bern 2006, N 27.40. 
19
  Cf. DFC 116 II 695, p. 696; DFC 120 II 182, p. 184; KRAMER, op. cit., Art. 18 N 71; SCHWENZER, op. cit., N 
27.35. For details regarding interpretation, see KRAMER, op. cit., Art. 18 N 22 et seq. 
20
  KRAMER, op. cit., Art. 18 N 71. Such an interpreted declaration of a party's will is called a "normative declaration 
of will", see SCHWENZER, op. cit., N 27.41. 
21
  DFC 125 III 305, p. 308; SCHWENZER, op. cit., N 27.41. 
22
  Federal Tribunal, 4P.253/2003, decision of 25 March 2004, at 5.3.; BERGER, op. cit., p. 3. 
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proceedings.23 Wording such as "shall refer to mediation first", in contrast, 
suggests a mandatory mediation process before arbitration.24 
If the parties indeed want mediation before arbitration, they should also mention 
a specific set of rules governing the mediation and|or mention a particular 
institution administrating it. 
Moreover, the parties should clarify within which time frame they want to try that 
their dispute is successfully solved by mediation. In the case decided by the 
Federal Tribunal mentioned in the beginning, namely, the Federal Tribunal stated 
that this serves as an indicator that the mediation proceedings are meant to be 
mandatory before arbitration.25 This factor, in the Federal Tribunal's view, is 
relevant because it is common practice to do this when the parties actually want 
to first settle their dispute amicably before submitting it to an arbitral tribunal. 
Whatever mechanism the parties prefer, they should discuss this issue in the 
drafting process and choose a wording that reflects their common will in the best 
way possible. 
B. Recognition of the Arbitration Agreement 
When discussing the issue of how the arbitration agreement is interpreted, the 
question of who is competent to interpret it immediately arises. 
Problems (e.g. conflicting decisions or a deadlock because neither the court nor 
the tribunal accepts its jurisdiction) could arise if one party initiates arbitration 
proceedings and the other party simultaneously submits the case to a national 
court. Depending on the procedural rules of the respective court, it could be 
competent to decide on the validity of the arbitration agreement.26 The New York 
Convention does not know a priority rule (i.e., that in the case of two pending 
parallel proceedings the arbitral tribunal's competence takes precedence over 
 
23
  BERGER, op. cit., p. 4. 
24
  BERGER, op. cit., p. 4. 
25
  Federal Tribunal, 4A_18/2007, decision of 6 June 2007. 
26
  See ARROYO, Lis Pendens in International Arbitration - The Newly Adopted Swiss Approach, in: Stockholm 
International Arbitration Review 2007:1, pp. 19-39, p. 23 et seq. 
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the court's competence), either.27 In Switzerland's newly28 amended arbitration 
law, the arbitral tribunal fortunately does not have to stay the proceedings and is 
still competent to decide on its jurisdiction regardless of the claim already being 
pending before a state court or another arbitral tribunal, unless serious reasons 
require it (Article 186 para. 1bis PILA). If the arbitral tribunal issues an interim 
award on jurisdiction, the national court would no longer be competent to decide 
on this question because of the principle of res iudicata. 
Still, this uncertainty could lead to procedural inefficiency or, in the worst case, 
lead to the result that the national court is competent and materially decide on 
the issue instead of an arbitral tribunal.29 
Similar problems exist with respect to the competence to hear and decide the 
merits of the dispute. 
While in member states30 of the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (NYC) arbitration agreements are 
generally recognized (Article II NYC) and, hence, no ordinary court could assume 
competence while there are ongoing voluntary mediation proceedings but an 
arbitration agreement exists, the situation could be different with regard to 
mandatory mediation proceedings. 
While the problem is not new with regard to jurisdiction of national courts not 
recognizing arbitration agreements at all - because then simple arbitration 
agreements would not be recognized, either -, some jurisdictions possibly could 
distinguish between normal arbitration agreements and such arbitration 
agreements that are subject to a condition precedent and, thus, theoretically not 
in effect, yet. 
 
27
  ARROYO, op. cit., p. 32. 
28
  March 1, 2007. 
29
  In Germany, the possibility of court and arbitral proceedings would be suspended. See BERGER, op. cit., p. 5. 
30
  Currently 142 Member States, see online at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 
NYConvention_status.html (last accessed: 12 October 2007). 
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For example, in the case HIM Portland v. DeVito Builders 31 decided by the United 
States Court of Appeals regarding a decision of the District Court of Maine in 
2003, the parties agreed that "Claims [...] arising out of or relating to this Contract 
[...] shall be referred initially to the Architect for decision. Such matters [...] shall, 
after initial decision by the Architect, or 30 days after submission of the matter to 
the Architect, be subject to mediation as a condition precedent to arbitration or 
the institution of legal or equitable proceedings by either party". The district court 
had denied HIM's motion to compel arbitration. HIM appealed, claiming that 
because the contract required arbitration, but not mediation, the court should 
have compelled arbitration. The Court of Appeals disagreed and stated: "under 
the plain language of the contract, the arbitration provision [...] is not triggered 
until one of the parties requests mediation." It continued:"[i]t is difficult to imagine 
language which more plainly states that the parties intended to establish 
mediation as a condition precedent to arbitration proceedings." The Court of 
Appeals generally stated that "arbitration is a matter of contract law and 
consequently a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute 
which he has not agreed so to submit". It further held that "the F[ederal] 
A[rbitration] A[ct]'s proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the 
wishes of the contracting parties". 
In this case, the Court left open the question of whether mediation is a condition 
precedent to bring suit at all (i.e., before a national court or before an arbitral 
tribunal), because the parties had not raised this issue. ADR-first clauses, 
namely, could indeed be regarded as a waiver of the possibility to sue before a 
court or tribunal before amicable dispute resolution has not taken place.32 Some 
jurisdictions regard such agreements as being procedural law agreement.33 In 
Switzerland, however, the Court of Cassation in Zurich34 has ruled that 
agreements not to sue (pactum de non petendo) are no procedural requirement 
but merely a question of substantial law and, hence, an action before a court is 
not to be dismissed as inadmissible. Rather, the claiming party risks that the 
claim is rejected for substantial reasons. The Federal Tribunal rejected an appeal 
 
31
  HIM Portland v. DeVito Builders, Inc., No. 02-1955 (1st Cir., Jan. 17, 2003), see online at: 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=1st/021955.html. 
32
  BERGER, op. cit., p. 5, with references e.g. to Germany and England, stating that, dogmatically, this could be 
regarded a pactum de non petendo. For Swiss law, see E.J. HABSCHEID, op. cit., p. 943. 
33
  BERGER, op. cit., p. 5. 
34
  See Kassationsgericht Zürich, decision of 15 March 1999, in ASA Bulletin 2002, pp. 373-376, p. 374. 
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against this decision.35 Authors discussing it criticized the Court of Cassation's 
decision.36 
The same problems could arise in an arbitration proceeding. An arbitral tribunal 
could, by exercising its competence-competence, come to the conclusion that it 
is not yet competent to hear the dispute because the effectiveness of the 
arbitration proceeding is suspended by the condition or it could reject the claim 
(temporarily or finally,37 as the case may be). Authors suggest that in the optimal 
case, arbitration proceedings should be validly initiated but then immediately 
suspended.38 In their view, arbitrators should - e.g. by means of a procedural 
order - set a time limit for the suspension.39 This allows the party relying on the 
mediation requirement to initiate such proceedings appropriately while 
simultaneously minimizing the risk of procedural inefficiency and of a limitation of 
the claim. 
In the case before the Swiss Federal Tribunal illustrated above, the Federal 
Tribunal mentioned that it could even be against good faith40 to rely on the two-
step mechanism while never instituting mediation proceedings itself.41 In Swiss 
law, the obvious abuse of rights is not protected (Article 2 para. 2 Civil Code). 
Bearing these problems in mind, the parties should check whether such a 
particular problem exists with regard to any jurisdiction involved and act 
accordingly (e.g., refrain from incorporating a two-step mechanism or sufficiently 
clarify their will). 
 
35
  Federal Tribunal, decision of 23 August 1999, mentioned in ASA Bulletin 2002, p. 375. 
36
  See VOSER, Sanktionen bei Nichterfüllung einer Schlichtungsklausel - 15. März 1999 - Kassationsgericht 
Zürich, in: ASA Bulletin 2002, pp. 376-381; BERGER, op. cit., p. 6. 
37
  WENGER|SCHOTT, in: Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), op. cit., Art. 186 N 23, stating that the arbitral tribunal 
could finally dismiss the claim if the condition precedent cannot be fulfilled. In Swiss law, however, according to 
Article 156 CO, a condition is deemed to be fulfilled (Art. 151 para. 2 CO) if one party acting in bad faith has 
prevented its occurrence. 
38
  VOSER, op. cit., p. 379; WENGER|SCHOTT, in: Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), op. cit., Art. 186 N 23. 
39
  See VOSER, op. cit., p. 379. 
40
  Because of contradictory behaviour ("venire contra factum proprium"). 
41
  Federal Tribunal, 4A_18/2007, decision of 6 June 2007, at 4.3.3. See also BERGER, op. cit., p. 14, stating that a 
party that has not initiated or even refused to participate in mediation cannot rely on this argument because of 
estoppel by conduct. 
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C. Possibility to Interrupt Periods of Limitation 
Another important issue that mediation-arbitration clauses could raise is their 
effect on the parties' possibility to interrupt running periods42 of limitation. 
Depending on the applicable law, namely, only initiating proceedings before a 
state court or initiating arbitration proceedings or initiating debt collection 
proceedings interrupt periods of limitations.43 
If the parties agreed on a mediation-arbitration procedure - and mediation is 
considered to be a condition precedent in the specific case - an arbitral tribunal 
would not be competent to hear the dispute, yet. In some cases, this could lead 
to the limitation of the claimant's claim during a mediation proceeding. 
To avoid this consequence, the parties to mediation-arbitration clauses should 
stipulate that mediation - despite being required before arbitration - does not 
have the effect that arbitration proceedings could not validly be initiated. Rather, 
the parties should provide that the arbitrators would have to suspend the 
arbitration proceedings so long as there are mediation proceedings going on that 
have not unsuccessfully ended (in accordance with the applicable rules). 
Alternatively, the parties should, as was suggested by the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
in the case mentioned in the beginning,44 implement periods within which 
mediation procedures should be initiated and successfully completed. In addition 
to serving as an indicator that the mediation proceedings are meant to be 
mandatory before arbitration, it serves the purpose to prevent the opposing party 
to unduly prolong and delay the dispute resolution process.45 
 
42
  For an article discussing the proper limitation regime in international sales contracts in international arbitration, 
see SCHWENZER|MANNER, 'The Claim is Time-Barred': The Proper Limitation Regime for International Sales 
Contracts in International Commercial Arbitration, in: Arbitration International, Vol. 23 No. 2 (2007), pp. 293-
307. 
43
  For Switzerland, see E.J. HABSCHEID, Die aussergerichtliche Vermittlung (Mediation) als Rechtsverhältnis, in: 
AJP/PJA 2001 pp. 938-944, p. 943. 
44
  Federal Tribunal, 4A_18/2007, decision of 6 June 2007. 
45
  Also see SCHUMACHER, Vertragsgestaltung, Systemtechnik für die Praxis, Zurich 2004, p. 115. 
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D. Danger of Avoidance of the Arbitration Agreement 
Another problem is that if - after interpretation - it is established by the arbitral 
tribunal that the parties' minds actually never met but that only, based on 
principles of reliance, the objectified normative interpretation of the parties' 
respective declaration of will leads to the result that one party is bound to the 
objective understanding of its declaration, this party might avoid the arbitration 
clause itself. By doing this, it could possible indirectly challenge the award. 
1. Possible Grounds for Avoidance and the Requirements for it 
If one party's will does not conform to the objective understanding of its 
declaration, an error with regard to this declaration (so-called "Erklärungsirrtum") 
could be at hand.46 Although an error regarding the question of whether the 
parties first wanted to mediate and only then to arbitrate is not covered by the 
cases set forth in Article 24 Ciff. 1.-3. CO, where the essentiality of the error - a 
necessary prerequisite in order to allow a party to avoid a contract (Article 23 
CO) - is assumed, this list is not exhaustive.47 
If, in the specific case, a party could actually show that the error was both 
subjectively and objectively essential, it could theoretically avoid the arbitration 
agreement. If the party - after the arbitral tribunal stated that a normative 
objective understanding of its declaration of will does not require mediation 
before arbitration - indeed avoids the arbitration agreement before or shortly48 
after an award was issued, this agreement falls away. 
It is somehow unlikely that the Federal Tribunal would actually follow the 
avoiding party's arguments that performing mediation actually was so essential to 
it that it only consented to waive the competence of the ordinary courts for the 
 
46
  An error in declaration ("Erklärungsirrtum") in form of an error regarding the content of the declaration 
("Inhaltsirrtum") is at hand if the declaring party wanted the declaration but attached a different meaning to it. 
See SCHWENZER, op. cit., N 37.09. 
47
  Although no cases exist where the essential nature of an error was accepted in cases not set forth in Art. 24 
Ciff. 1.-3. CO. See SCHWENZER, in: Honsell|Vogt|Wiegand (eds.), Obligationenrecht I: Art. 1-529 OR, 4th ed., 
Basel 2007, Art. 24 N 1. 
48
  The period within which avoidance for reasons or an error is possible under Swiss law is 1 year after the party's 
knowledge that it erred, Article 31 CO. 
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rare49 event that mediation was not successful. By showing the will to submit their 
dispute to mediation and then to arbitration, the parties unambiguously showed 
their will to waive the competence of ordinary state courts. This is true for both 
cases, where the parties wanted a two-step approach or just an option to try 
mediation before arbitration. But the risk still exists. 
2. Effects of a Successful Avoidance of the Agreement to Arbitrate 
Despite the fact that a successful avoidance of the arbitration agreement 
because of an error is unlikely, in the following, the consequences of a 
successful avoidance will be discussed. 
In normal situations, avoiding a contract because of error has a retroactive (ex 
tunc) effect. That means that the contract is considered to never have existed.50 
The only exception to this rule exists in cases of contracts for the performance of 
a continuing obligation ("Dauerschuldverhältnisse"). In these cases, the contract 
does not retroactively fall away but the avoidance only affects the future of the 
contract (ex nunc).51 
The effect of a hypothetical avoidance of the arbitration agreement because of 
one party's error in declaration, hence, depends on the question of qualifying the 
arbitration agreement as a continuous obligation. 
An arbitration agreement is not limited to a single exchange of performances. 
This would indeed qualify it as a continuing obligation. This view seems to also 
be advanced in legal literature. Some authors rely on the rules governing 
continuous obligations contracts when arguing in connection with a party's right 
to terminate the arbitration agreement.52 They argue that the parties to an 
arbitration agreement - independent from the question of whether it is a contract 
 
49
  According to some statistics, mediation is very successful. See, for example, the statistics of CMAP - Centre de 
Médiation et d’Arbitrage de Paris, online at: http://www.mediationetarbitrage.com, showing that 71% of all its 
efforts to solve disputes by mediation, ended successfully. According to other sources, almost 80% of all cases 
submitted to mediation result in a settlement. See Mediation Seen as Highly Effective ADR Process, 2006 Juris 
Net. 
50
  SCHWENZER, op. cit., N 39.23. 
51
  DFC 129 III 320, p. 328 et seq.; SCHWENZER, op. cit., N 39.25. 
52
  See WENGER|MÜLLER, in: Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), op. cit., Art. 178 N 85; RÜEDE|HADENFELDT, op. cit., 
p.103. 
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of material or procedural law53 - form some kind of procedural partnership.54 Other 
authors hold a different view but also state that the rules of continuous obligation 
contracts must be applied in analogy.55 
The consequence of this qualification - or at least the analogous application of 
the rules - is that any avoidance of the arbitration agreement because of an error 
does not retroactively affect the validity of the arbitration agreement on which the 
arbitral tribunal based its competence.56 Only in case of future disputes, the 
parties could no longer rely on the lapsed arbitration agreement but would have 
to go in front of the competent court in order to settle their dispute or would have 
to conclude a new arbitration agreement. 
E. Danger that the Award May be Challenged 
In Switzerland, the 12th chapter of the Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA) 
applies as lex arbitri if the arbitral tribunal's seat is within Switzerland and at least 
one party did not have its place of business within Switzerland at the time of the 
conclusion of the arbitration agreement (Article 176 para. 1 PILA). Hence, if one 
party challenges an award by an arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland, Articles 
190 to 192 PILA apply. These articles limit the grounds for challenge to specific 
issues. 
In Switzerland, the award may be set aside only for one of the following 
(exhaustive)57 reasons: First, if the sole arbitrator or the tribunal, respectively, 
was constituted in an irregular way. Second, if the arbitral tribunal wrongfully 
accepted or declined jurisdiction.58 Third, if the arbitral tribunal decided on points 
 
53
  For this discussion see HABSCHEID (and Berti), Schweizerisches Zivilprozess- und Gerichtsorganisationsrecht, 
2nd ed. Basel 1990, p. 515 et seq. 
54
  HABSCHEID (and Berti), op. cit., p. 516. 
55
  RÜEDE|HADENFELDT, op. cit., p. 197, N 669. 
56
  See also RÜEDE|HADENFELDT, op. cit., p.104, stating that the validity of a final and effective award is not 
affected by a subsequent forfeiture or termination of the arbitration agreement on which it is based. 
57
  DFC 119 II 380, p. 383; Federal Tribunal, 4P.208/2004, decision of 14 December 2004, at 3.1.; Federal 
Tribunal, 4A.17/2007, decision of 8 June 2007, at 3.2.; MÜLLER, op. cit., p. 142; BERTI|SCHNYDER, in: 
Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), op. cit., Art. 190 N 24. 
58
  This includes cases where the arbitral tribunal assumed jurisdiction regarding issues not covered by the 
arbitration agreement. BERTI|SCHNYDER, in: Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), op. cit., Art. 190 N 38, 53. 
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of dispute that were not submitted to it (ultra petita) or if the arbitral tribunal left 
prayers for relief undecided which were correctly submitted to it (infra petita).59 
Fourth, if the principle of equal treatment of the parties or the right to be heard 
was violated. Finally, the award may be set aside if it is incompatible with 
Switzerland's public policy, i.e. if it violates fundamental rules of law.60 
1. Waiver of the Possibility to Challenge 
The parties may think of waiving the possibility to challenge the award. This, 
however, is only possible in certain cases and specific requirements must be 
respected. 
a) No Place of Business in Switzerland 
First, a waiver is only possible if none of the parties has its domicile, ordinary 
residence or a business establishment in Switzerland. The negative requirement 
of the absence of a business establishment in Switzerland even frustrates a 
waiver if one of the parties merely has a branch in Switzerland that, however, is 
in no way involved in the dispute.61 If one of the parties has a Swiss subsidiary 
that is not involved in the dispute at all, the waiver is admissible.62 Hence, such a 
waiver is not possible in all cases. 
b) Express Waiver of Particular Appeal Required 
If a waiver of the possibility to challenge the award is possible, the parties must 
agree on the waiver of the right to challenge the award either by an explicit 
 
59
  BERTI|SCHNYDER, in: Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), op. cit., Art. 190 N 53. 
60
  E.g. the principle of pacta sunt servanda. This principle is violated if the arbitral tribunal, for example, 
acknowledges the existence of a contract but disregards the consequences arising therefrom. Cf. 
BERTI|SCHNYDER, in: Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), op. cit., Art. 190 N 74; HEINI, in: Zürcher Kommentar 
zum IPRG, 2nd ed., Zurich 2004, Art. 190 N 45. 
61
  PATOCCHI|JERMINI, in: Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), op. cit., Art. 192 N 4 et seq.; MÜLLER, International 
Arbitration: A Guide to the Complete Swiss Case Law (Reported and Unreported), Zurich 2004, p. 10. 
62
  PATOCCHI|JERMINI, op. cit., Art. 192 N 5. The reason for this is that the subsidiary is legally independent. 
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agreement in the written arbitration agreement or in another written63 subsequent 
agreement (Article 192 para. 1 PILA).64 
An agreement that the arbitral tribunal should definitively decide on the subject 
matter of the dispute, with the exclusion of ordinary courts, expresses no will of 
the parties to waive any possibilities to challenge the award in front of the 
Federal Tribunal. It is not sufficient to globally waive the possibility to appeal the 
award, either. The parties must clearly state the right of appeal they want to 
waive and actually waive it.65 
If the parties indeed want to waive the possibility of challenge, the parties, for 
example, could state in the respective arbitration agreement: "The parties 
explicitly waive the possibility to challenge the arbitral tribunal's award within the 
meaning of Article 192 of the Swiss Private International Law Act of December 
18, 1987, as amended". 
c) No Possibility of Waiver by Reference 
The parties drafting their contract might think that the reference to a set of rules 
providing for the waiver of the possibility to challenge the award is sufficient. The 
WIPO Rules, for example, to which the parties referred in the case discussed in 
the beginning, state that "[b]y agreeing to arbitration under these Rules, the 
parties undertake to carry out the award without delay, and waive their right to 
any form of appeal or recourse to a court of law or other judicial authority, insofar 
as such waiver may validly be made under the applicable law" (Article 64, Effect 
of the Award). 
But in Swiss arbitration law, indirect waivers, i.e., if the waiver of the right to 
appeal the award is only set forth in the rules of arbitration, are not sufficient.66 
 
63
  The term "written" is to be understood within the meaning of Article 178 para. 1 PILA, i.e., means of 
communication that allow proof of the agreement by text. See PATOCCHI|JERMINI, op. cit., Art. 192 N 13. 
64
  According to a recent decision by the Federal Tribunal, the written consent to waive the possibility to challenge 
the award is invalid, if it is not based on the free will of both parties. This will could, in the specific case, be 
limited if there are exceptional circumstances, such as, for example, a strict hierarchy and imbalance of power 
between an athlete and a sports organization. See DFC 133 III 235, p. 242, at 4.3.2.2. 
65
  DFC 116 II 639, p. 640. 
66
  DFC 116 II 639, p. 640; Federal Tribunal, 4P.62/2004, decision of 1 December 2004, at 1.2. 
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This is true even in cases where the rules themselves do not acknowledge this 
fact, as do the WIPO Rules by stating "insofar as such waiver may validly be 
made under the applicable law". In the case before the Federal Tribunal 
mentioned above, the Federal Tribunal accordingly correctly rejected the 
existence of a waiver. 
Consequently, parties who agree that there should be no possibility to challenge 
an award rendered by the arbitral tribunal should clearly state so in their 
arbitration agreement. This would not be a mere restatement of the arbitration 
rules agreed upon by the parties but rather safeguards the validity of the waiver 
when the place of arbitration is in Switzerland. 
2. Wrongful Acceptance of Jurisdiction by an Arbitral Tribunal and the 
Federal Tribunal's Cognizance 
If there is no (valid) waiver by the parties with regard to the possibility to set 
aside the award, the alleged lack of jurisdiction (Article 190 para. 2 lit. b. PILA) is 
of primary importance in the context of pre-arbitral mediation or conciliation 
mechanisms agreed upon by the parties. 
As we have seen above, ambiguous clauses require the interpretation by the 
arbitral tribunal or the court, as the case may be. 
If the interpretation leads to the normative result that the correct understanding 
would have been that a two-step approach was not objectively intended by the 
parties, the arbitration agreement is not subject to a condition precedent and, 
hence, valid from the moment of its conclusion. The consequence then would be 
that the award would not have to be set aside. 
If, however, the parties normatively agreed on a two-step approach - i.e., first 
mediate, and then arbitrate - the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the 
dispute, yet. In this case, either the arbitral tribunal rejected its jurisdiction in the 
first place, or if the arbitral tribunal assumed jurisdiction nevertheless, any award 
could be set aside. 
The party that argued against the possibility to initiate arbitration proceedings 
where there was no mediation beforehand could accordingly think that it simply 
refers the question of the validity of the arbitration agreement to the Federal 
Tribunal. This party could expect that the Federal Tribunal comes to a different 
conclusion and sets aside the award because of lack of jurisdiction. 
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If the parties' consent to arbitrate was not based on the actual will67 but on the 
objective normative interpretation of the parties' declaration by the arbitral 
tribunal, this indeed is a legal question that could be verified by the Federal 
Tribunal in the context of Art. 190 para. 2 lit. b PILA.68 
The challenging party, however, should lower its expectations with regard to the 
success of the challenge. The arbitral tribunal, namely, based its decision on the 
facts of the specific case. 
An appeal to the Swiss Federal Tribunal regarding an award by an arbitral 
tribunal, in general,69 is governed by the same rules as an appeal against a 
decision by one of the highest cantonal courts (Article 191 PILA and Article 77 of 
the Act on the Federal Tribunal, FTA). 
Theoretically, the Federal Tribunal is free to legally verify the competence of the 
arbitral tribunal - including preliminary questions of material law.70 But, the 
Federal Tribunal is principally bound by the facts on which the arbitral tribunal 
based its decision (Article 105 FTA), unless these facts are the issue of the 
appeal or new facts exist.71 The result of this limited competence of the Federal 
Tribunal is that it will be unlikely that it comes to a different conclusion with 
regard to the interpretation of the arbitration agreement than the arbitral tribunal 
did. 
 
67
  Which would then be a fact established by the arbitral tribunal on which the Federal Tribunal is principally 
bound. Federal Tribunal, 4P.253/2003, decision of 25 March 2004, at 5.3. 
68
  Federal Tribunal, 4P.253/2003, decision of 25 March 2004, at 5.3. 
69
  Only in accordance with Articles 190-192 PILA and with other differences, e.g. regarding the Federal Tribunal's 
possibility to decide on the merits of the case. 
70
  Federal Tribunal, 4P.253/2003, decision of 25 March 2004, at 4.2.; BERTI|SCHNYDER, in: 
Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), op. cit., Art. 190 N 36. 
71
  Federal Tribunal, 4A_42/2007, decision of 13 July 2007 ("Das Bundesgericht prüft die Zuständigkeitsrüge nach 
Art. 190 Abs. 2 lit. b IPRG in rechtlicher Hinsicht frei, einschliesslich materiellrechtliche Vorfragen, von deren 
Beantwortung die Zuständigkeit abhängt. Allerdings überprüft das Bundesgericht die tatsächlichen 
Feststellungen des angefochtenen Schiedsentscheids auch im Rahmen der Zuständigkeitsrüge nur, wenn 
gegenüber diesen Sachverhaltsfeststellungen zulässige Rügen im Sinne von Art. 190 Abs. 2 IPRG vorgebracht 
oder ausnahmsweise Noven berücksichtigt werden"). For previous decisions, see DFC 133 III 139, p. 141; DFC 
129 III 727, p. 733. See also SEILER|WERDT|GÜNGERICH, Bundesgerichtsgesetz (BGG), Bern 2007, Art. 77 N 8; 
BERTI|SCHNYDER, in: Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), op. cit., Art. 190 N 51; HEINI, in: Zürcher Kommentar 
zum IPRG, op. cit., Art. 191 N 14. 
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It seems surprising that the Swiss Federal Tribunal's cognizance is that limited. 
However, it was an intentional decision by the legislator to limit the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal's competence regarding decisions by arbitral tribunals in international 
arbitration.72 Moreover, it is in line with the general principle of competence-
competence and the intentionally limited possibility to verify the arbitrators' 
decision associated with it. 
III. Insides Gained 
From the discussion above, certain lessons can be learned. 
The parties' incorporation of mediation-arbitration clauses in their contracts 
raises additional problems and uncertainties. The parties, however, can deal with 
these problems. 
Hence, parties should clearly state whether they only want arbitration in case of 
an unsuccessful attempt to mediate or whether it is a mere voluntary option. 
Preferably, the parties should provide periods within which mediation must be 
initiated (and in accordance with which rules) and the time frame for finding a 
possible amicable resolution to their dispute. 
Additionally, if the parties agree on a mandatory two-step approach, they should 
carefully contemplate the problems that such a mechanism could create, e.g. 
with regard to limitation periods or jurisdiction of other courts. Once they have 
contemplated these problems, they should decide on them and proactively state 
their common will. 
If both parties have their place of business outside of Switzerland, they could 
waive the possibility to challenge the award in front of the Federal Tribunal by 
express wording in the written arbitration clause. 
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  BERTI|SCHNYDER, in: Honsell|Vogt|Schyder|Berti (eds.), op. cit., Art. 190 N 24. 
